"Search in a Non-exclusive Online Matching Platform"

(with Emre Dogan and Levent Celik)

Every year more people around the world use dating platforms. Yet little is understood about the marriage markets when there are profit maximizing platforms operating in the market. We analyze a standard search and matching model of a marriage market but with a non-exclusive matching platform. Subscribers to the platform enjoy an additional flow of contacts through the platform in exchange for a flow-price for subscription and can continue to search outside of the platform. We first describe the set of search equilibria when there is a platform. Then, we prove existence of an equilibrium with non-zero subscription at a positive price. Finally, for uniform distribution of types, we numerically calculate the equilibrium, matching, type-distribution of singles and a demand function that the platform faces. We find that market demand for subscription may locally increase with price due to consumption externalities emerges in the market.